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Abstract:
We investigate systems of indirect voting based on the law of Penrose, in
which each representative in the voting body receives the number of votes
(voting weight) proportional to the square root of the population he or she
represents. For a generic population distribution, the quota required for the
qualified majority can be set in such a way that the voting power of any
state is proportional to its weight. For a specific distribution of population
the optimal quota has to be computed numerically. We analyse a toy voting
model for which the optimal quota can be estimated analytically as a function
of the number of members of the voting body. This result, combined with
the normal approximation technique, allows us to design a simple, efficient,
and flexible voting system, which can be easily adopted for varying weights
and number of players.
Keywords: power indices; weighted voting games; optimal quota; Penrose
square root law; normal approximation
JEL classification: C71; D71
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1 Introduction
A game theory approach proved to be useful to analyse voting rules imple-
mented by various political or economic bodies. Since the pioneering contri-
butions of Lionel Penrose (1946) who originated the mathematical theory of
voting power just after the World War II, this subject has been studied by a
number of researchers, see, e.g. Felsenthal and Machover (1998, 2004a) and
references therein.
Although the current scientific literature contains several competing def-
initions of voting indices, which quantitatively measure the voting power
of each member of the voting body, one often uses the original concept of
Penrose. The a priori voting power in his approach is proportional to the
probability that a vote cast by a given player in a hypothetical ballot will be
decisive: should this country decide to change its vote, the winning coalition
would fail to satisfy the qualified majority condition. Without any further
information about the voting body it is natural to assume that all poten-
tial coalitions are equally likely. This very assumption leads to the concept
of Penrose-Banzhaf index (PBI) called so after John Banzhaf (1965), who
introduced this index independently.
Recent research on voting power was partially stimulated by the political
debate on the voting system used in the Council of Ministers of the European
Union (EU). The double majority system endorsed in 2004 by The Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, based on ‘per capita’ and ‘per state’
criteria, was criticized by several authors (e.g. Paterson and Sila´rszky (2003),
Baldwin and Widgre´n (2004), Bilbao (2004), Bobay (2004), Cameron (2004),
Kirsch (2004), Plechanovova´ (2004), Z˙yczkowski and S lomczyn´ski (2004),
Plechanovova´ (2006), Taagepera and Hosli (2006), Algaba et al. (2007)),
who pointed out that it is favourable to the most and to the least populated
EU countries at the expense of all medium size states. Ironically, a similar
conclusion follows from a book written fifty years earlier by Penrose, who
also discovered this drawback of a ‘double majority’ system.1
In search for an optimal two-tier voting system (where a set of constituen-
cies of various size elect one delegate each to a decision-making body) Penrose
(1946) considered first a direct election in a state consisting of M voters and
proved that the voting power of a single citizen decays as 1/
√
M , provided
1Penrose (1952) wrote: ‘[...] if two votings were required for every decision, one on
a per capita basis and the other upon the basis of a single vote for each country. This
system [...] would be inaccurate in that it would tend to favour large countries.’
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that the votes are uncorrelated. To compensate this effect he suggested that
the a priori voting power of each representative in the voting body should
behave proportionally to
√
M making the citizens’ voting power in all states
equal and so the whole system representative (the Penrose square root law).
Systems, where the voting weight of each state is proportional to the
square root of its population were discussed by several authors in the EU
context, see Laruelle and Widgre´n (1998), Hosli (2000), Tiilikainen and
Widgre´n (2000), Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2002), Laruelle and Va-
lenciano (2002), Moberg (2002), Mabille (2003), Widgre´n (2003), College of
Europe (2004), Felsenthal and Machover (2004b), Hosli and Machover (2004),
Plechanovova´ (2004), Widgre´n (2004). Different experts have proposed dif-
ferent quotas for a square root voting systems, usually varying from 60% to
74%. Clearly, the choice of an appropriate decision-taking quota (threshold)
q affects both the distribution of voting power in the Council (and thus also
the representativeness of the system) and the voting system’s efficiency and
transparency.
However, the assertion that the voting weight of each country should be
proportional to the square root of its population does not entirely solve the
problem of distributing the power. Kirsch (2004) expressed this as follows:
‘The square root law tells us how the power should be distributed among
the countries. It is, however not clear at a first glance how to implement
it in terms of voting weights, as the voting weights do not give the power
indices immediately’. Accordingly, the question arise: how to solve the in-
verse problem, i.e. how to allocate weights and how to set quota (threshold)
for qualified majority (the Council reaches a decision when the sum of the
weights of the Member States voting in favour exceeds the threshold) to ob-
tain required distribution of power, see Laruelle and Widgre´n (1998), Sutter
(2000), Leech (2002), Lindner and Machover (2004), Widgre´n (2004), Pajala
(2005), Aziz et al. (2007).
The answer we proposed in (Z˙yczkowski and S lomczyn´ski (2004)) is sur-
prisingly simple: one should choose the weights to be also proportional to the
square root of the population and then find such an optimal quota q∗ that
would produce the maximally transparent system, that is a system under
which the voting power of each Member State would be approximately equal
to its voting weight, or more precisely, the mean discrepancy ∆ between the
voting power of each state and the rescaled root of its population would be
minimal. Then the Penrose law would be practically fulfilled, and the poten-
tial influence of every citizen of each Member State on the decisions taken in
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the Council would be almost the same.
For a concrete distribution of population in the EU consisting of 25 (resp.
27) member states it was found in (Z˙yczkowski and S lomczyn´ski (2004),
Z˙yczkowski et al. (2006), see also Feix et al. (2007)) that the discrep-
ancy exhibits a sharp minimum around a critical quota q
∗
∼ 62% (resp.
61.5%) falling down to a negligible value. Therefore, the Penrose square
root system with this quota is optimal, in the sense that every citizen in
each member state of the Union has the same voting power (measured by
the Penrose-Banzhaf index), i.e. the same influence on the decisions taken by
the European Council. Such a voting system occurs to give a larger voting
power to the largest EU states than the Treaty of Nice but smaller than the
draft European Constitution, and thus has been dubbed by the media as the
‘Jagiellonian Compromise’.
The existence of such a critical quota q∗ for which the rescaled PBIs of all
states are approximately equal to their voting weights, is not restricted to this
particular distribution of population in the EU. On the contrary, it seems
to be a rather generic behaviour which was found by means of numerical
simulations for typical random distributions of weights in the voting body
generated with respect to various probability measures, see Z˙yczkowski and
S lomczyn´ski (2004), Chang et al. (2006), S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2006).
The value of q∗ depends to some extent on a given realization of the random
population distribution, but more importantly, it varies considerably with
the number M of the member states. In the limit M → ∞ the optimal
quota seems to tend to 50%, in consistence with the so called Penrose limit
theorem (see Lindner (2004), Lindner and Machover (2004)), which claims
that for the quota 50% the relative power of two voters tends asymptotically
to their relative voting weight.
Working with random probability distributions it becomes difficult to get
any analytical prediction concerning the functional dependence of q∗ on the
number M of the members of the voting body. Therefore in this work we
propose a toy model in which an analytical approach is feasible. We compute
the PBIs for this model distribution of population consisting ofM states and
evaluate the discrepancy ∆ as a function of the quota q. The optimal quota
q∗ is defined as the value at which the quantity ∆ achieves its minimum.
This reasoning performed for an arbitrary number of states M allows us to
derive an explicit dependence of the optimal quota on M . Results obtained
analytically for this particular model occur to be close to these received earlier
in numerical experiments for random samples. The normal approximation
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of the number of votes achieved by all possible coalitions provides another
estimate of the optimal quota as a function of the quadratic mean of all
the weights. The efficiency of voting systems with optimal quota does not
decrease when the number of players M increases.
Applying these results we are tempted to design a simple scheme of in-
direct voting (the double square root voting systems) based on the square
root law of Penrose supplemented by a rule setting the approximate value of
the optimal quota q∗ as a function either of the square root of the number
of players or the square root of the sum of their weights. Such systems are
representative, transparent and efficient.
This work is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we recall the definition of
Penrose-Banzhaf index and define the optimal quota. Sect. 3 provides a de-
scription of the toy model of voting in which one player is c times stronger
than all other players. We describe the dependence of the optimal quota in
this model on the number of voters for c = 2 and c = 3. In Sect. 4 we discuss
the optimal quota applying an alternative technique of normal approxima-
tion. The paper is concluded in Sect. 5, where we design a complete voting
system. The heuristic proof of the validity of the normal approximation
method is given in the Appendix.
2 A priori voting power and critical quota
Consider a set of M members of the voting body, each representing a state
with population Nk, k = 1, . . . ,M . Let us denote by wk the voting weight
attributed to k-th representative. We work with renormalised quantities,
so that
∑M
i=1wi = 1, and we assume that the decision of the voting body
is taken if the sum of the weights of all members of the coalition exceeds
the given quota q ∈ [0.5, 1], i.e. we consider so called (canonical) weighted
majority voting game [q;w1, . . . , wM ], see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
To analyse the voting power of each member one has to consider all 2M
possible coalitions and find out the number ω of winning coalitions which
satisfy the qualified majority rule adopted. The quantity A := ω/2M mea-
sures the decision-making efficiency of the voting body, i.e. the probability
that it would approve a randomly selected issue. Coleman (1971) called this
quantity the power of a collectivity to act. For a thorough discussion of this
concept, see Lindner (2004).
The absolute (or probabilistic) Penrose–Banzhaf index (PBI) ψk of the k–
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th state is defined as the probability that a vote cast by k–th representative
is decisive. This happens if k is a critical voter in a coalition, i.e. the
winning coalition with k ceases to fulfil the majority requirements without
k. Assuming that all 2M coalitions are equally likely, we see that the PBI
of the k–th state depends only on the number ωk of winning coalitions that
include this state. Namely, the number ηk of coalitions where a vote of k is
decisive is given by:
ηk = ωk − (ω − ωk) = 2ωk − ω . (1)
Moreover, the absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index of the k–th state is equal to
ψk = ηk/2
M−1. To compare these indices for decision bodies consisting of
different number of players, it is convenient to define the normalised PBIs:
βk :=
ψk∑M
i=1 ψi
=
ηk∑M
i=1 ηi
(2)
(k = 1, . . . ,M) fulfilling
∑M
i=1 βi = 1.
In the Penrose voting system one sets the voting weights proportional to
the square root of the population of each state, i.e. wk =
√
Nk/
∑M
i=1
√
Ni
for k = 1, . . . ,M . For any level of the quota q one may compute numerically
the power indices βk. The Penrose rule would hold perfectly if the voting
power of each state was proportional to the square root of its population.
Hence, to quantify the overall representativeness of the voting system one
can use the mean discrepancy ∆, defined by
∆ :=
√√√√ 1
M
M∑
i=1
(βi − wi)2 . (3)
The optimal quota q∗ is defined as the quota for which the mean discrepancy
∆ is minimal. Note that this quota is not unique and usually there is a whole
interval of optimal points. However, the length of this interval decreases with
increasing number of voters.
Studying the problem for a concrete distribution of population in the
European Union, as well as using a statistical approach and analyzing several
random distributions of population we found (Z˙yczkowski and S lomczyn´ski
(2004), Z˙yczkowski et al. (2006)) that in these cases all M ratios βk/wk
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(k = 1, . . . ,M), plotted as a function of the quota q, cross approximately
near a single point q∗, i.e.
βk (q∗) ≈ wk (q∗) (4)
for k = 1, . . . ,M . In other words, the discrepancy ∆ at this critical quota q∗
is negligible. The existence of the critical quota was confirmed numerically
in a recent study by Chang et al. (2006). (This does not contradict the fact
that there is a wide range of quotas, where the mean discrepancy is relatively
small, see Widgre´n (2004), Pajala (2005).) In the next section we propose
a toy model for which a rigorous analysis of this numerical observation is
possible.
3 Toy model
Consider a voting body of M members and denote by wk, k = 1, . . . ,M
their normalized voting weights. Assume now that a single large player
with weight wL := w1 is the strongest one, while remaining m := M − 1
players have equal weights wS := w2 = · · · = wM = (1 − wL)/m. We
may assume that wL ≤ 1/2, since in the opposite case, for some values of
q, the strongest player would become a ‘dictator’ and his relative voting
power would be equal to unity. Furthermore, we assume that the number of
small players m is larger than two, and we introduce a parameter c := wL/wS
which quantifies the difference between the large player and the other players.
Thus we consider the weighted voting game
[
q; c
m+c
, 1
m+c
, . . . , 1
m+c
]
, where the
population distribution is characterized by only two independent parameters,
say, the number of players M and the ratio c. Sometimes it is convenient
to use as a parameter of the model the weight wL, which is related with the
ratio c by the formula c = mwL/(1− wL). On the other hand, the qualified
majority quota q, which determines the voting system, is treated as a free
parameter and will be optimized to minimize the discrepancy (3). Note that
a similar model has been analysed in Merrill (1982).
To avoid odd-even oscillations in the discrepancy ∆ (q) we assume that
c ≥ 2. To compute the PBIs of all the players we need to analyse three
kinds of possible winning coalitions. The vote of the large player is decisive
if he forms a coalition with k of his colleagues, where k < mq/(1− wL) and
k ≥ m(q−wL)/(1−wL). Using the notion of the roof, i.e. the smallest natural
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number larger than or equal to x, written as ⌈x⌉ := min{n ∈ N : n ≥ x}, we
may put
j1 :=
⌈
m(q − wL)
1− wL
⌉
− 1 (5)
and
j2 :=
⌈
mq
1− wL
⌉
− 1 , (6)
and recast the above conditions into the form
j1 + 1 ≤ k ≤ j2 . (7)
On the other hand, there exist two cases where the vote of a small player is
decisive. He may form a coalition with j2 other small players, or, alterna-
tively, he may form a coalition with the large player and j1 small players.
With these numbers at hand, we may write down the absolute Penrose–
Banzhaf indices for both players. The a priori voting power of the larger
player can be expressed in terms of binomial symbols:
ψL := ψ1 = 2
−m
j2∑
k=j1+1
(
m
k
)
, (8)
while the voting power for all the small players is equal and reads:
ψS := ψ2 = · · · = ψM = 2−m
[(
m− 1
j1
)
+
(
m− 1
j2
)]
. (9)
It is now straightforward to renormalize the above results according to (2)
and use the normalized indices βL and βS to write an explicit expression for
the discrepancy (3), which depends on the quota q. Searching for an ‘ideal’
system we want to minimize the discrepancy
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∆(q) =
1√
M
√
(βL − wL)2 +m (βS − wS)2
=
1√
M
√
(βL − wL)2 +m
(
1− βL
m
− 1− wL
m
)2
(10)
=
√
1 + 1/m
M
|βL − wL| (11)
=
1√
m
∣∣∣∣βL − cm+ c
∣∣∣∣
=
1√
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑j2
k=j1+1
(
m
k
)
∑j2
k=j1+1
(
m
k
)
+m
((
m−1
j1
)
+
(
m−1
j2
)) − cm+ c
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1√
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑⌈d⌉−1
k=⌈d−c⌉
(
m
k
)
∑⌈d⌉−1
k=⌈d−c⌉
(
m
k
)
+m
((
m−1
⌈d−c⌉−1
)
+
(
m−1
⌈d⌉−1
)) − cm+ c
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (12)
where d := mq/ (1− wL) = (m+ c) q.
In principle, one may try to solve this problem looking first for the optimal
d and then computing the optimal quota q∗, but due to the roof in the bounds
of the sum the general case is not easy to work with.
The problem simplifies significantly if we set c = 2, considering the M–
point weight vector (wL, wL/2, . . . , wL/2), where wL = 2/ (M + 1).
In such a case, (12) becomes
∆(q) =
1√
m
∣∣∣∣∣
(
m
r−2
)
+
(
m
r−1
)
(
m
r−2
)
+
(
m
r−1
)
+m
((
m−1
r−3
)
+
(
m−1
r−1
)) − 2
m+ 2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
(m+ 2)
√
m
∣∣∣∣m2 − 4mr + 5m+ 4r2 − 12r + 8m2 − 2mr + 4m+ 2r2 − 6r + 5
∣∣∣∣ , (13)
where r := ⌈d⌉ = ⌈(M + 1) q⌉. To analyse this dependence we introduce a
new variable
t := r −M/2− 1 = ⌈(M + 1) q⌉ −M/2− 1 , (14)
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obtaining
∆(t) =
2
(M + 1)
√
M − 1
|M − 4t2|
M2 + 4t2
=
4
(M + 1)
√
M − 1
√
M + 2t
M2 + 4t2
∣∣∣√M/2− t∣∣∣ . (15)
In principle, one can minimize this expression finding min∆(t) = 0 for
t∗ =
√
M/2, see Fig.1a. However, due to the presence of the roof function
in (14), ∆ (q) is not a continuous function of the quota, and, consequently,
the optimization problem min∆(q) does not have a unique solution and the
minimal value may be greater than 0, see Fig.1b. Nevertheless, applying
(14) and (15), one can show that there exists an optimal quota q∗ (M) in the
interval
M +
√
M
2(M + 1)
≤ q∗ (M) ≤ 2 +M +
√
M
2(M + 1)
. (16)
qt
D(t) D(q)
a) b)
0 1 2 3 4 5 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
t
*
q
*
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
Figure 1: a) The ‘mean discrepancy’ ∆ (t) as a function of the parameter t;
b) The mean discrepancy ∆ (q) as a function of the parameter q (in both
cases c = 2, M = 27)
This means that for a large number M of players the optimal quota
behaves exactly as
q∗ (M) ≃ qs (M) := 1
2
(
1 +
1√
M
)
. (17)
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Although this is an asymptotic formula, it works also for a moderate number
of states. Moreover, it follows from (13) and (16) that the minimal mean
discrepancy ∆(q∗ (M)) ≤ 8/M3.
Surprisingly, the efficiency of the system given by
A (qs (M)) =
∑M−1
k=r(M)−2
(
M−1
k
)
+
∑M−1
k=r(M)
(
M−1
k
)
2M
=
∑M
k=r(M)
(
M
k
)
+
(
M−1
r−2
)
2M
, (18)
where r (M) := ⌈(M + 1) qs (M)⌉, does not decrease with the number of
players to 0. On the contrary, it is always larger than 15/128 ≈ 0.117 and,
according to the central limit theorem, it tends to 1 − Φ(1) ≈ 0.159 for
M →∞.
Analogous considerations for c = 3 give similar result:
1 +M +
√
M
2(M + 1)
≤ q∗ (M) ≤ 3 +M +
√
M
2(M + 1)
, (19)
and so, also in this case, q∗ (M) ≃ 12(1 + 1/
√
M).
4 Normal approximation
Let us have a closer look at the approximate formula (17) for the optimal
quota. In the limit M → ∞ the optimal quota tends to 1/2 in agreement
with the Penrose limit theorem, see Lindner (2004), Lindner and Machover
(2004). Numerical values of the approximate optimal quota qs obtained in
our toy model for c = 2 and c = 3 are consistent, with an accuracy up
to two per cent, with the data obtained numerically by averaging quotas
over a sample of random weights distributions (generated with respect to the
statistical measure, i.e. the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with Jeffreys’
priors), see Z˙yczkowski and S lomczyn´ski (2004), Z˙yczkowski et al. (2006).2
2Nevertheless, one can construct an artificial model with different values of optimal
quota. In this aim, it is enough to consider one ‘small’ state and an even number of ‘large’
states with equal population (i.e. c < 1 in our toy model), see Lindner (2004), Lindner and
Machover (2004). As Lindner stressed: ‘experience suggests that such counter-examples
are atypical, contrived exceptions’.
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Furthermore, the above results belong to the range of values of the quota
for qualified majority, which have been used in practice or recommended by
experts on designing the voting systems.
Consider now a voting body of M members and denote by wk, k =
1, . . . ,M , their normalized voting weights fulfilling
∑M
i=1wi = 1. Feix et al.
(2007) proposed (also in the EU context) yet another method of estimating
the optimal quota for the weighted voting game [q;w1, . . . , wM ], where q ∈
[0.5, 1]. They considered the histogram n of the sum of weights (number of
votes) achieved by all possible coalitions
n (z) =
card
{
I ⊂ {1, . . . ,M} :∑i∈I wi = z}
2M
(20)
and assumed that it allows the normal approximation with the mean value
m = 1
2
∑M
i=1wi =
1
2
and the variance σ2 = 1
4
∑M
i=1w
2
i , i.e.
N (q) :=
∑
z≤q
n (z) ≈
∫ q
−∞
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(x−m)
2
2σ2
)
dx = Φ
(
q −m
σ
)
,
(21)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The au-
thors argued that for the quota close to the inflection point qn := m+σ of the
normal curve, where the ‘density’ of the histogram is approximately linear,
the ratios βk/wk (k = 1, . . . ,M) are close to 1. In other words, the quota qn
is close to the optimal quota q∗. In Appendix we show how this fact follows
from the normal approximation formula for the absolute Banzhaf indices. In
particular we use heuristic arguments to demonstrate that in this case
ψk ≈
√
2
pie
wk√∑M
i=1w
2
i
(22)
and, in consequence,
βk ≈ wk (23)
for k = 1, . . . ,M . The validity of this method depends on the accuracy of
the normal approximation for the absolute Banzhaf indices (see Appendix).
The necessary condition for the latter is
max
j=1,...,M
wj ≪
√√√√ M∑
i=1
w2i . (24)
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For the thorough discussion of the problem see Owen (1975), Leech (2003),
Lindner (2004), Feix et al. (2007). For the Penrose voting system, where
wk ∼
√
Nk (k = 1, . . . ,M), (24) is equivalent to
max
j=1,...,M
Nj ≪
M∑
i=1
Ni , (25)
which means that the population of each country is relatively small when
compared with the total population of all countries. One can easily check
that it is more likely that (24) holds in this case than when the weights are
proportional to the population.
Approximating the optimal quota q∗ by the inflection point of the normal
distribution, qn = m+ σ, we arrive at an explicit weights-dependent formula
for the optimal quota:
q∗ ≃ qn (w1, . . . , wM) := m+ σ = 1
2

1 +
√√√√ M∑
i=1
w2i

 . (26)
This approximation of the optimal quota can be directly compared with the
approximation (17) obtained for the toy model. Since
∑M
i=1wi = 1 implies∑M
i=1w
2
i ≥ 1/M , it follows that
qs (M) =
1
2
(
1 +
1√
M
)
≤ 1
2
(
1 +
1√
Meff
)
= qn , (27)
where Meff := 1/
∑M
i=1w
2
i is equal to the effective number of players. (This
quantity was introduced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and is the in-
verse of the more widely used Herfindahl–Hirschman index of concentration
(Hirschman (1945), Herfindahl (1950), see also Feld and Grofman (2007).)
The equality in (27) holds if and only if all the weights are equal. For the
Penrose voting system we have
qn =
1
2

1 +
√∑M
i=1Ni∑M
i=1
√
Ni

 , (28)
where Nk stands for the population of the k-th country. For the toy model
we get qn =
1
2
(
1 +
√
M+c2−1
M+c−1
)
≃ qs (M) for large M .
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Both approximations qs and qn are consistent with an accuracy up to two
per cent, with the optimal quotas q∗ obtained for the Penrose voting system
applied retrospectively to the European Union (see Tab. 1 below). Observe
that in this case the approximation of the optimal quota q∗ by qn is better for
larger number of states, where the normal approximation of the histogram is
more efficient.
M 15 25 27
year 1995 2004 2007
qs [%] 62.9 60.0 59.6
q∗ [%] 64.4 62.0 61.5
qn [%] 64.9 62.2 61.6
Tab. 1. Comparison of optimal quotas for the Penrose voting system
applied to the EU (q∗) and for two approximations (qs, qn).3
Applying the normal approximation one can easily explain why the ef-
ficiency A of our system does not decrease when the number of players M
increases. We have
A(qs) ≥ A (qn) ≈ 1−N (qn) ≈
∫ ∞
m+σ
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(x−m)
2
2σ2
)
dx . (29)
The right-hand side of this inequality depends neither on m nor on σ, and
it equals 1 − Φ(1) ≈ 15.9%, where Φ is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function.
5 Double square root voting system
We shall conclude this paper proposing a complete voting system based on
the Penrose square root law. The system consists of a single criterion only
and is determined by the following two rules:
3The calculations are based on data from: 50 years of figures on Europe. Data 1952-
2001. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities: Luxembourg; 2003,
and on data from: EUROSTAT: Lanzieri G. Population in Europe 2005: first results.
Statistics in focus. Population and social conditions 2006; 16: 1-12.
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A. The voting weight attributed to each member of the voting body of size
M is proportional to the square root of the population he or she represents;
B. The decision of the voting body is taken if the sum of the weights of
members of a coalition exceeds the quota qs = (1 + 1/
√
M)/2.
These rules characterize the double square root system: On one hand,
the weight of each state is proportional to the square root of its population,
on the other hand, the quota decreases to 0.5 inversely proportionally to the
square root of the size of the voting body. If the weights wi are fixed, one can
set the quota to qn = (1+ (
∑M
i=1w
2
i )
1/2)/2, or just take the optimal quota q∗
which, however, requires more computational effort.
Such a voting system is extremely simple, since it is based on a single
criterion. It is objective and so cannot a priori handicap a given member
of the voting body. The quota for qualified majority is considerably larger
than 50% for any size of the voting body of a practical interest. Thus the
voting system is also moderately conservative. Furthermore, the system is
representative and transparent: the voting power of each member of the
voting body is (approximately) proportional to its voting weight. However, as
a crucial advantage of the proposed voting system we would like to emphasize
its extendibility: if the size M of the voting body changes, all one needs to
do is to set the voting weights according to the square root law and adjust
the quota. The system is also moderately efficient: as the number M grows,
the efficiency of the system does not decrease.
The formulae for the quotas qs (M) and qn can be also applied in other
weighted voting games. Note that for a fixed number of players the quota
qs (M) does not depend on the particular distribution of weights in the voting
body. This feature may be relevant, e.g. for voting bodies in stock companies
where the voting weights of stockholders depend on the proportion of stock
that investors hold and may vary frequently.
Although the limiting behaviour M → ∞ may not necessarily be inter-
esting for politicians, our work seems to have some practical implications for
the on-going debate concerning the voting system in the Council of the EU.
Since the number of Member States is not going to be explicitly provided in
the text of the European Constitution, one should rather avoid to include
any specific threshold for the qualified majority. In fact the optimal quota
depends on the number of members of the voting body, so there should be a
possibility to adjust it in future without modifying the European Constitu-
tion.
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Appendix: Optimal quota for the normal approximation
In this appendix we show that in vicinity of the inflection point qn = m+σ
of the normal distribution the relative Banzhaf indices βj are close to the
weights wj. This reasoning holds in particular for the Penrose voting system,
for which the weights are proportional to the square root of the populations.
Consider a weighted voting game [q;w1, . . . , wM ], where q ∈ [0.5, 1] and∑M
i=1wi = 1. Set m :=
1
2
∑M
i=1wi =
1
2
and σ2 := 1
4
∑M
i=1w
2
i . Let j =
1, . . . ,M . We put mj := m− wj/2 and σ2j := σ2 − w2j/4.
The absolute Banzhaf index
ψj = Pr
({
I ⊂ {1, . . . ,M} : q − wj ≤
∑
i∈I,i 6=j
wi < q
})
(A1)
is equal to the difference of the number of wining coalitions formed with and
without the j–th player divided by 2M−1. A key step in our reasoning is to
assume that the sum of weights of the members of a coalition can be approxi-
mated by the normal distribution. This assumption implies that the Banzhaf
index ψj is approximately equal to the difference of two normal cumulative
distribution functions taken at two points shifted by the corresponding weight
wj,
ψj ≈ Φ (q;mj , σj)− Φ (q − wj ;mj, σj) . (A2)
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Here Φ (x;µ, d) = Φ ((x− µ)/d) stands for the normal cumulative distribu-
tion function with mean µ and standard deviation d. Therefore
ψj ≈ Φ
(
q −mj
σj
)
− Φ
(
q − wj −mj
σj
)
. (A3)
We are going to analyse the behaviour of the power indices at the inflec-
tion point, q = qn := m+ σ. In such a case,
ψj ≈ Φ
(
m+ σ −mj
σj
)
− Φ
(
m+ σ − wj −mj
σj
)
= Φ
(
σ + 1
2
wj
σj
)
− Φ
(
σ − 1
2
wj
σj
)
= Φ
(√
1 + vj
1− vj
)
− Φ
(√
1− vj
1 + vj
)
, (A4)
where vj := wj/2σ = wj/
√∑M
i=1w
2
i . If wj ≪
√∑M
i=1w
2
i , then vj ≪ 1, and
both
√
(1 + vj) / (1− vj) and
√
(1− vj) / (1 + vj) are close to 1. Near this
point the standard normal density function Φ′ is almost linear and so
Φ
(
σ + 1
2
wj
σj
)
− Φ
(
σ − 1
2
wj
σj
)
≈ Φ′
(
σ
σj
)
wj
σj
. (A5)
¿From (A4) and (A5) we deduce that
ψj ≈ Φ′
(
σ
σj
)
wj
σj
=
1√
2pi
wj
σj
exp
(
− σ
2
2σ2j
)
=
√
2
pi
wj√(∑M
i=1w
2
i
)
− w2j
exp

− ∑Mi=1w2i
2
((∑M
i=1w
2
i
)
− w2j
)


=
√
2
pi
vj√
1− v2j
exp
(
− 1
2
(
1− v2j
)
)
=
√
2
pie
vj + o
(
v4j
)
. (A6)
17
Consequently,
ψj ≈
√
2
pie
wj√∑M
i=1w
2
i
+ o
(
v4j
)
, (A7)
and so
βj
wj
≈ 1 . (A8)
The above reasoning shows that if we select the inflection point qn for
the quota q, then all the normalised Penrose–Banzhaf indices βj are approx-
imately equal to the weights wj, and so qn must be close to the critical quota
q∗ The accuracy of this approximation depends highly on the accuracy of the
normal approximation in (A2).
Note that for the quota q = m = 1/2 we get (see Lindner (2004), Lindner
and Machover (2004) for the formal proof)
ψj ≈ Φ′ (0) wj
σj
=
√
2
pi
wj√(∑M
i=1w
2
i
)
− w2j
=
√
2
pi
wj√∑M
i=1w
2
i
+ o
(
v2j
)
. (A9)
In this case, the second order terms in vj are present and, in consequence,
the indices βj need not be as close to wj as for q = qn, where (A7) holds up
to corrections of order four in vj . Moreover, it is interesting to note, that
increasing the threshold from m = 1/2 to qn = m + σ = 1/2 + σ causes the
decrease of the absolute power indices φj by the factor 1/
√
e ≈ 0.607.
18
References
Algaba, E., Bilbao, J.M. and Ferna´ndez, J.R. (2007), The distribution
of power in the European Constitution, European Journal of Operational
Research 176: 1752-1766.
Aziz, H., Paterson, M. and Leech, D. (2007), Efficient Algorithm for
Designing Weighted Voting Games. Preprint.
http://www.dcs.warwick.ac.uk/reports/cs-rr-434.pdf
Baldwin, R.E. and Widgre´n, M. (2004), Council Voting in the Constitu-
tional Treaty: Devil in the Details. (CEPS Policy Briefs No. 53; Centre for
European Policy Studies, Brussels)
http://hei.unige.ch/%7Ebaldwin/PapersBooks/Devil in the details BaldwinWidgren.pdf
Banzhaf, J.F. (1965), Weighted voting does not work: A mathematical
analysis, Rutgers Law Review 19: 317-343.
Bilbao, J.M. (2004), Voting Power in the European Constitution. Preprint.
http://www.esi2.us.es/˜mbilbao/pdffiles/Constitution.pdf
Bobay, F. (2004), Constitution europe´enne: redistribution du pouvoir des
E´tats au Conseil de l’UE, E´conomie et Pre´vision 163: 101-115.
Cameron, D.R. (2004), The stalemate in the constitutional IGC over the
definition of a qualified majority, European Union Politics 5: 373-391.
Chang, P.-L., Chua, V.C.H. and Machover, M. (2006), L S Penrose’s limit
theorem: Tests by simulation, Mathematical Social Sciences 51: 90-106.
Coleman, J.S. (1971), Control of collectivities and the power of a collec-
tivity to act, in: B. Lieberman (ed.), Social Choice, New York: Gordon and
Breach. Reprinted in: J.S. Coleman, 1986, Individual Interests and Collective
Action, Cambridge University Press.
College of Europe (2004), Making Europe Work: A Compromise Proposal
on Voting in the Council. College of Europe: Warsaw and Bruges.
http://www.coleurop.be/content/publications/pdf/ MakingEuropeWork.pdf
Feix, M.R., Lepelley, D., Merlin, V. and Rouet, J.L. (2007), On the voting
power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members, Social Choice
and Welfare 28: 181-207.
Feld, S.L. and Grofman, B. (2007), The Laakso-Taagepera index in a
mean and variance framework, Journal of Theoretical Politics 19: 101-106.
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998),Measurement of Voting Power:
Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.
19
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2001), Treaty of Nice and qualified
majority voting, Social Choice and Welfare 18: 431-464.
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2002), Enlargement of the EU and
Weighted Voting in its Council of Ministers [online]. LSE Research Online:
London.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/407/01/euenbook.pdf
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover M. (2004a), A priori voting power: What
is it all about? Political Studies Review 2: 1-23.
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover M. (2004b), Qualified majority voting ex-
plained, Homo Oeconomicus 21: 573-576.
Herfindahl, O.C. (1950), Concentration in the Steel Industry. PhD Dis-
sertation; Columbia University.
Hirschman, A.O. (1945), National Power and Structure of Foreign Trade.
University of California Press: Berkeley.
Hosli, M.O. (2000), Smaller States and the New Voting Weights in the
Council. (Working Paper, Netherlands Institute of International Relations,
Clingendael, July 2000)
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2000/20000700 cli ess hosli.pdf
Hosli, M.O. and Machover, M. (2004), The Nice Treaty and voting rules in
the Council: a reply to Moberg (2002), Journal of Common Market Studies
42: 497-521.
Kirsch, W. (2004), The New Qualified Majority in the Council of the EU.
Some Comments on the Decisions of the Brussels Summit. Preprint.
http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/mathphys/politik/eu/Brussels.pdf
Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979), Effective number of parties: a
measure with application to West Europe, Comparative Political Studies 12:
3-27.
Laruelle, A. and Valenciano, F. (2002), Inequality among EU citizens in
the EU’s Council decision procedure, European Journal of Political Economy
18: 475-498.
Laruelle, A. and Widgre´n, M. (1998), Is the allocation of voting power
among the EU states fair? Public Choice 94: 317-339.
Leech, D. (2002), Designing the voting system for the Council of the EU.
Public Choice 113: 437-464.
Leech, D. (2003), Computing power indices for large voting games, Man-
agement Science 49: 831-837.
20
Lindner, I. (2004), Power Measures in Large Weighted Voting Games
Asymptotic Properties and Numerical Methods. PhD Dissertation; Univer-
sita¨t Hamburg.
http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=972400516
Lindner, I. and Machover, M. (2004), L. S. Penrose’s limit theorem: proof
of some special cases, Mathematical Social Sciences 47: 37-49.
Lindner, I. and Owen, G. (2007), Cases where the Penrose limit theorem
does not hold, Mathematical Social Sciences 53: 232-238.
Mabille, L. (2003), Essai sur une juste ponde´ration des voix au Conseil
de l’Union europe´enne. Preprint; see also: Dubois, N., Ponde´ration des voix:
la preuve par “27”, Liberation 26/11/2003.
http://pageperso.aol.fr/lcmabille/
Merrill III, S. (1982), Approximations to the Banzhaf index of voting
power, American Mathematical Monthly 89: 108-110.
Moberg, A. (2002), The Nice Treaty and voting rules in the Council,
Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 259-82.
Owen, G. (1975), Multilinear extensions and the Banzhaf value, Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly 22: 741-750.
Pajala, A. (2005), Maximal Proportionality between Votes and Voting
Power: The Case of the Council of the European Union [online]. LSE Re-
search Online: London.
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/VPP/VPPpdf/VPPpdf Wshop4/pajala.pdf
Paterson, I. and Sila´rszky, P. (2003), Draft Constitution and the IGC:
Voting can be Simple and Efficient - without introducing the Massive Transfer
of Power implied by the Convention’s Double Majority Proposal. (Institute
for Advanced Studies, Vienna, December 2003).
http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/forum2ihsdec2003.pdf
Penrose, L.S. (1946), The elementary statistics of majority voting, Jour-
nal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53-57.
Penrose, L.S. (1952), On the Objective Study of Crowd Behaviour. H.K.
Lewis & Co: London.
Plechanovova´, B. (2004), Draft Constitution and the Decision-Making
Rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU - Looking for Alternative So-
lution. (European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 8, No. 12)
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-012.pdf
21
Plechanovova´, B. (2006), Je rozhodovac´ı procedura v Radeˇ Evropske´ unie
spravedliva´? Mezina´rodn´ı vztahy 1: 5-22.
S lomczyn´ski, W. and Z˙yczkowski, K. (2006), Penrose voting system and
optimal quota, Acta Physica Polonica 37: 3133-3143.
Sutter, M. (2000), Fair allocation and re-weighting of votes and voting
power in the EU before and after the next enlargement, Journal of Theoretical
Politics 12: 433-449.
Taagepera, R. and Hosli, M.O. (2006), National representation in inter-
national organizations: the seat allocation model implicit in the European
Union Council and Parliament, Political Studies 54: 370-398.
Tiilikainen, T. and Widgre´n, M. (2000), Decision-making in the EU: a
small country perspective, The Finnish Economy and Society 4: 63-71.
Widgre´n, M. (2003), Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules. (Eu-
ropean Economy Group, University of Madrid Working Papers No. 23)
http://www.ucm.es/info/econeuro/documentos/documentos/ dt232003.pdf
Widgre´n, M. (2004), Enlargements and the Principles of Designing EU
Decision-Making Procedures, in: Blankart, C.B. and Mueller, D.C. (eds.), A
Constitution for the European Union, MIT Press, pp. 85-108.
Z˙yczkowski, K. and S lomczyn´ski, W. (2004), Voting in the European
Union: The Square Root System of Penrose and a Critical Point. Preprint
cond-mat.0405396; May 2004.
http://arxiv.org/ftp/cond-mat/papers/0405/0405396.pdf
Z˙yczkowski, K., S lomczyn´ski, W. and Zastawniak, T. (2006), Physics for
fairer voting, Physics World 19: 35-37.
22
